



**Central  
Intelligence**

OCPAS/CIG

CY# 285

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# National Intelligence Daily

*Thursday  
11 August 1983*

~~Top Secret~~

CPAS NID 83-188JX

11 August 1983

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


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
**FRANCE-CHAD-LIBYA: French Military Response**

*Some French troops are being sent to Chad following the capture of Faya-Largeau yesterday by Libyan and dissident forces.* 

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French defense officials announced yesterday that as many as 500 troops from France and Central African Republic will be sent to Chad over the next few days. The troops from France reportedly include commandos who could provide communications, intelligence, or special action support 

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
Guy Penne, President Mitterrand's chief African adviser, has told the US Embassy that the troops will be deployed at N'Djamena, Abeche, and other locations. He claimed French troops will not be withdrawn if these places come under attack. French Defense Minister Hernu has said that French policy will be to match Libyan actions. 

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
Chadian claims of Libyan airstrikes yesterday on Faya-Largeau have not been confirmed. According to a Chadian official, government units retook Oum Chalouba yesterday, 

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
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**Comment:** The decision to send troops to Chad suggests that Paris may be weighing other military responses to additional Libyan and insurgent actions. The French also may be considering removing President Habre as a preliminary to negotiations with the Libyans, which might involve a partition of the country. Mitterrand usually postpones difficult decisions until the last moment. 

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The quick recapture of Faya-Largeau and the limited French military reaction to Libya's intervention will encourage Libyan leader Qadhafi to push ahead with the campaign to oust Habre. Although Libyan and dissident forces will now take time to resupply and regroup, they probably believe that the danger of the French intervention to save Habre has declined. 

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Habre is in N'Djamena, but a rout of his northern troops—the key to his power—could leave him vulnerable to a coup. Southerners with little taste for the fighting may favor negotiations with the dissidents. 

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**UN-CHAD: Security Council Debate**

*There will be some rhetorical and considerable private support for the Chadian Government as debate resumes in the Security Council, but the threat of a Soviet veto and Libyan influence with the nonaligned majority of the Council are likely to prevent an explicit condemnation of Libyan action.*

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US Embassies report Jordan, Malta, and Pakistan would abstain from voting on a condemnation of Libya. Guyana is angry about a recent US decision to vote against a proposed loan from the Inter-American Development Bank. In debate on Chad in the Council last March, the nonaligned caucus resisted Soviet and Libyan pressure and finally achieved a consensus statement asserting the UN should have a role.

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**Comment:** Libya has enough influence over the nonaligned caucus members to avoid an explicit condemnation. Togo, Chad's strongest supporter on the Council, is the current chairman of the caucus and may be able to organize support for a mild consensus resolution somewhat critical of Libya.

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
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**LEBANON: Army Clashes With the Druze**

*The Druze attack yesterday on a Lebanese Army battalion may lead the Christian militia to retaliate against Druze positions in the Shuf and force President Gemayel to cooperate with Christian militia commanders in arranging the Army's deployment to the region.* [ ]

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The Army responded to the attack in the mountains southeast of Beirut by placing two brigades on alert and providing artillery support. Israeli forces, however, reportedly prevented the Lebanese from sending reinforcements or supplies. [ ]

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Fighting continued throughout the day, with the Druze overrunning two Army positions and capturing 12 armored personnel carriers. Druze artillery also shelled the Beirut suburbs and the airport. As the fighting subsided, the Israelis were trying to arrange a cease-fire. [ ]

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The Druze yesterday also kidnaped three Lebanese cabinet ministers, who had been dispatched to the Shuf by the government to arrange an end to the fighting. According to press reports, the kidnapers have demanded the resignation of the entire cabinet as a condition for the release of the three. [ ]

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**Comment:** The Army and most Christians are likely to view the attack and the shelling of Beirut's suburbs as a deliberate challenge to government authority. Commanders of the Christian Lebanese Forces militia may use the incidents to persuade Gemayel that their militiamen should lead an Army deployment into the Shuf. [ ]

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The attack may strengthen popular support for the Army, but the battalion's poor showing and the government's inability to come to its aid may seriously damage Army morale. The incident calls into question the central government's ability to maintain security in the areas to be vacated by the Israelis—probably the Druze objective. [ ]

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**EL SALVADOR: Military Progress Continues**

*The guerrillas remain on the defensive as the government continues counterinsurgency operations.* [redacted]

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Insurgent forces have been dislodged from their base areas in Morazan, San Vicente, and Chalatenango Departments, according to Salvadoran military sources. Several towns long held by the guerrillas in Morazan are now occupied by government troops, who are using small-unit tactics in outlying areas to impede the insurgents' ability to regroup. [redacted]

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Civic action projects—including building schools and roads, and providing doctors, teachers, and technicians—are being accelerated in areas recaptured from the guerrillas. [redacted]

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[redacted] the local populace is receptive to the Army's increased presence and is providing valuable intelligence on guerrilla activities. [redacted]

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[redacted] government forces are concerned about possible guerrilla counterattacks. As a result, the Army plans new offensives in Cuscatlan and western Usulután Departments to keep the insurgents off balance. [redacted]

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**Comment:** The armed forces previously have not sustained simultaneous military and civic campaigns on several fronts. The growing resolve of troops and officers is underscored by the decision to forgo the national holiday last week and remain in the field. [redacted]

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Nevertheless, the insurgents will be quick to strike at towns or military garrisons that appear vulnerable. [redacted] the guerrillas still are planning for increased actions this month and next. Although the insurgents appear to be suffering some spot shortages of weapons and other supplies, [redacted] they continue to receive shipments from Nicaragua by air, land, and sea. [redacted]

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**HONDURAS-NICARAGUA-CUBA: Guerrilla Infiltration**

About 100 armed, Nicaraguan- and Cuban-trained Hondurans reportedly entered Honduras from Nicaragua last month and established a camp near the Patuca River in Olancho Department. According to a Honduran military source, two deserters from the camp have indicated that the group intends to begin unspecified operations next month. The same source says the Honduran military plans to try to capture the infiltrators this week. [ ]

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**Comment:** The group is not in a position to threaten preparations elsewhere in the country for combined Honduran-US maneuvers. Nevertheless, this [ ] reports of infiltration indicate that the Sandinistas are following through on their threat to increase subversive activities against Honduras. Operations against the group probably will be hindered by the difficult terrain in the area. [ ]

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25X1**MEXICO-NICARAGUA: New Oil Agreement**

The US Embassy in Managua reports that under the terms of a new agreement Mexico will no longer fully finance Nicaraguan oil purchases. Nicaragua will have to pay 80 percent of the bill upon shipment. Beginning in 1985, Managua also has agreed to repay its accumulated oil debt to Mexico of roughly \$300 million. [ ]

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**Comment:** By putting Nicaragua on the same aid terms as other beneficiaries of the San Jose accords, Mexico may be trying to appear more evenhanded in its efforts to reduce regional tensions. The new payment requirements probably will end Mexico's role as Nicaragua's largest lender and will magnify Managua's financial difficulties. The Mexicans may eventually back off, however, if the new requirements prove too costly to the Sandinista regime. Unless other lenders step in, Nicaragua this year will be forced to cut its already low volume of imports by up to 30 percent. [ ]

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
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**NIGERIA: Shagari Wins Reelection**

Returns from all 19 states indicate President Shagari has won reelection with slightly more than 12 million votes, more than 4 million votes ahead of his chief rival, Obafemi Awolowo. In 1979 Shagari defeated Awolowo by fewer than 1 million votes. Shagari also was able to win at least 25 percent of the vote in 16 states, fulfilling complex constitutional requirements that the winner have both a nationwide plurality and at least 25 percent in two-thirds of the states. Defeated candidates have already begun to contest the results.

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**Comment:** Despite over 60 million registered voters, only an estimated 20 million turned out at the polls. The election was remarkably free of public disturbances, but the preparations for and the conduct of the elections were surrounded by controversy and allegations of rigging and polling irregularities. Although the opposition is likely to attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the presidential elections, general anticipation of the gubernatorial elections on Saturday probably will temper most negative popular reaction.

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**UN-AFGHANISTAN: Pessimism on Talks**

A senior UN negotiator involved in the periodic indirect talks on Afghanistan sponsored by the organization in Geneva says he and other UN officials believe the discussions are stalled because neither the USSR nor Pakistan currently is interested in serious negotiations. According to the official, UN mediator Cordovez is reconsidering consultations scheduled for late this month in Moscow, Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran because he cannot produce an agreed text on noninterference guarantees that the Soviets want. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar probably questions the value of the talks and may threaten to postpone them to gain concessions. Both sides have benefited diplomatically from the talks and may show some new flexibility to keep them going. Nevertheless, withdrawal by the Soviets and noninterference guarantees by Pakistan and its allies remain issues unlikely to be resolved any time soon. [REDACTED]

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**MEXICO: Opium Eradication Program**

Recent statistics on the opium poppy eradication program in Mexico confirm estimates [REDACTED] that opium production this year will reach some 17 tons. This is roughly the amount produced each year since 1980. When processed, the opium will account for nearly one-third of the 4 to 5 tons of heroin sold yearly in the US. [REDACTED]

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The eradication program began in 1976, with partial US funding, after opium production had reached an estimated 65 tons a year. It uses Mexican Army forces and an aerial spray campaign to destroy poppy fields. Farmers have been able to limit the effectiveness of the program by reducing the size of their fields, moving them beyond traditional growing areas, hiding them under camouflage, and locating them in steep ravines to frustrate airborne herbicide application. Without the eradication program, however, farmers could have produced some 35 tons of opium this year. [REDACTED]

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**EAST GERMANY-USSR: New Armored Personnel Carrier**

An article in an East German military journal and sightings by Western military observers reveal that the East Germans have begun replacing some of their BTR-60 armored personnel carriers with the newest Soviet-wheeled APC—the BTR-70. East Germany is the first country in Eastern Europe to field a regiment equipped with the BTR-70, which went into service with Soviet units in 1978. The BTR-70 has more power than the BTR-60 and greater mobility over rugged terrain. It also is better equipped to operate in nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare environments and has thicker armor than the BTR-60. [REDACTED]

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**Comment:** Several years ago the East Germans were planning to begin an intensive modernization program to improve the mobility and firepower of their weapons. With rising costs and an economic slowdown, they still have not matched their pace of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when they fielded a new family of tanks and APCs throughout their forces. Nonetheless, East Germany has the best equipped non-Soviet force in the Warsaw Pact. [REDACTED]

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## **Special Analysis**

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### **LEBANON: Prospects for Conflict in the Shuf District**

*As the Israelis prepare to withdraw from the Alayh and Shuf districts, the Druze militia and the Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces militia are preparing for a bloody struggle for control of the region. The attack by the Druze yesterday on the only Lebanese Army position in Alayh and their shelling of the Beirut airport are intended as warnings to President Gemayel. The Druze hope to persuade him that no deployment of the Army into the area is possible until he reaches an agreement with Druze leader Walid Junblatt. Gemayel's ability to govern will be seriously threatened if the Druze and Muslims conclude that the Army favors the Christians during any new outbreak of fighting in the Shuf.*

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The planned Israeli withdrawal offers Gemayel his first significant opportunity to demonstrate his determination to rule evenhandedly over Lebanon's sectarian groups. The extension of government authority to the region would help restore the confidence of non-Christian Lebanese in Gemayel. Prospects are poor, however, that the government will be able to contain the 150-year-old struggle for power between the Druze and the Christians in the mountains southeast of Beirut.

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### **Background to the Conflict**

Most of Lebanon's 180,000 Druze live in a tightly knit, self-sufficient mountain community that jealously maintains its traditional domination over the Shuf and Alayh districts. The Christians, however, comprise a significant minority of the population of the Shuf. The Lebanese Forces militia has long sought control over the strategically located mountain area overlooking Beirut.

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In recent years Junblatt and the militia of his Progressive Socialist Party have accepted increasing Syrian financial and military aid in their struggle against the Christians. The Syrians use their material support to manipulate the weak and irresolute Junblatt.

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The Christians have turned to Israel for support. After their invasion of Lebanon, the Israelis permitted the Lebanese Forces militia to establish a strong military presence in the area under the guise of protecting the Christian population. Following a serious military setback at the hands of the Druze in February, Lebanese Forces leaders sent Samir Ja'ja, a militia commander despised by the Druze for his brutality, to take control of the Shuf and Alayh.

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**No Agreement in Sight**

With Syria's support, Junblatt has repeatedly threatened that his militia will resist any move by the Army into the area without a prior agreement with the Druze. The Army's officer corps is dominated by the Christians, and the Druze believe the Army's deployment into the mountains would serve merely as a cover for Lebanese Forces military operations against them. [ ]

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At a minimum, the Druze are demanding the withdrawal of Lebanese Forces militiamen not native to the Shuf and an agreement not to disarm the Druze before a general disarmament that includes the Christians. The attack yesterday, however, may lead the government to abandon any further negotiations with the Druze. [ ]

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Even if a last-minute accord is reached, Gemayel has little leverage over Lebanese Forces militia commanders, who are increasingly disdainful of the President's authority. The militia will refuse to relinquish its arms or to withdraw from the area. [ ]

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Gemayel probably believes that he has no alternative but to try to send the Army into the region. The Army plans to deploy two brigades commanded by Christian officers to take over from the Israelis. [ ]

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In the absence of an agreement, violence may be averted only if the Multinational Force plays a supporting role. Junblatt, who respects both the French and the US, has hinted that the Druze might accept a combined force deployment. [ ]

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**Outlook**

The Druze are preparing for an all-out battle in the Shuf and Alayh. Druze women and children reportedly are evacuating the villages, and Druze men of fighting age are leaving Beirut for the mountains. [ ]

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Any indication that the Lebanese Forces militia is expanding its control could cause further Druze attacks against Army positions or Christian villages. In addition, commanders of the Lebanese Forces may provoke clashes in an attempt to force Gemayel and the Army to choose between the Druze and the Christians. [ ]

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Syria will continue to provide arms and perhaps artillery support to the Druze. The Syrians want to avoid clashing with the Lebanese Army, and they are unlikely to commit their own troops to the defense of the Druze. Such a move might invite Israeli intervention. [ ]

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Lebanese Army units, which are composed of members from differing factions, probably will hold together initially even in the face of Druze opposition and harassment by the Lebanese Forces. Violence in the Shuf and Alayh is unlikely to threaten the government's authority over the Beirut area as long as Gemayel and the Army are seen as impartial. [REDACTED]

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Evidence of favoritism by the government in its dealings with the Christian militia, however, probably would encourage active Muslim opposition to government authority in Beirut. Intense Muslim-Christian violence in the capital would seriously risk splitting the Army along factional lines. [REDACTED]

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